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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

BY

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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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1 March 1990

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ABSTRACT

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The Indian Navy, which is already the 5th largest in the world and the largest in the Indian Ocean region, is not predicated solely on the rationale of defensive security doctrine. There are clear indications from the force levels, expansion program, and statements of Indian political/military leaders and defense experts, of an offensive maritime security doctrine for the Indian Navy, with regional and global objectives. India apparently aims to dominate the Indian Ocean by raising the cost of superpower intervention, so as to exercise hegemony over the Indian Ocean littoral from Australia to South Africa. Such a politico-military aim is a matter of great concern not only for the smaller states of South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia, but also the world powers having vital political, economic, and strategic interests in the region. The Indian aims and objectives seem to threaten not only the security of the smaller littoral states but also eventually the world order by creating regional imbalance and destabilization of the smaller and already fragile societies of the region. There is need, therefore, for Pakistan to analyze its Indian Ocean security posture vis-a-vis India, with a view toward identifying Islamabad's policy alternatives. (SI)

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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Ours is an oceanic world. The seven seas, covering nearly two-thirds of the earth, have long been regarded as international property by nations who had the need, the will, and the strength to use them for economic, political, military, social, or cultural purposes. The oceans will continue to be the main highway of trade and the meeting ground of nations with their interests and ideologies, sometimes in accord and sometimes in conflict with one another. The four great continental masses give the ocean a distinctly three-part form, the Atlantic, the Indian, and the Pacific Oceans, all three joining together into one around Antarctica.

The oceans of the world, no less than the continents have their neglected areas, and in this context the Indian Ocean provides an example. Although the smallest of the world's oceans, its commercial and economic importance has never been in question.¹ In the second half of the twentieth century the Indian Ocean has become an area of political conflict; in particular the Persian Gulf has become a focus of increased strategic concern for the superpowers. The rapid changes on the international scene have brought this region into sharp focus as far as world politics is concerned.² These changes include the erosion of British maritime power, emergence of China as a major power, the rise of Japan and a few other states in Asia as the economic giants, and, of course, the increased presence of American and Soviet fleets in the Indian Ocean.

Speculations are that the Indian Ocean area will be the world's main hot bed of conflicts in the coming decades. China is becoming increasingly

involved. India has launched a vigorous naval expansion program, with the help of the USSR, to build three independent fleets, i.e., Eastern, Western, and Southern Fleets along with substantial amphibious capability. She wants the superpowers to leave this region and envisages a time when she will be the only littoral state with the will and capability to police the Indian Ocean. The volatile situation thus created alarms the littoral states, which have limited means to actualize their desire to defend their sovereign status. Therefore an in-depth understanding of various factors leading to the present scene in the Indian Ocean has become imperative before any viable strategy can be formulated for Pakistan.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

For well over a century this ocean was virtually a British lake. The absence of any serious naval challenge helped Britain to control all the entry points and regulate trade within the Indian Ocean region until the outbreak of the Second World War. The post-war era brought a series of radical changes in the British position and witnessed the emergence of the United States and the USSR as superpowers. Their war-crippled economy forced the British to withdraw gradually from "east of Suez," and within a short span of 20 years almost all the former British colonies had acquired the status of independent nation-states. The British finally decided in 1968 to quit the region altogether and to link their future defense with that of Western Europe. Consequently the two superpowers stepped in to satisfy their own interests. Available evidence makes it quite clear that Soviet entry was strongly influenced by its determination to achieve seaborne parity with the United States on the one hand and ongoing competition between the two for political influence and economic gains on the other.

GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Being the smallest of the five oceans and flanked on three sides by land, the Indian Ocean is often called half an ocean.³ According to Vallanx, its area is 16,362,742 square miles, Schott believes that it is 30,095,723 square miles; and Stanley thinks it is 27,000,000 square miles.⁴ The Indian Ocean has the greatest width of about 6,000 miles at 40° South, between the Cape of Good Hope and the southwestern tip of Australia.⁵ The Gulf of Aden, situated in the northeast of the Indian Ocean, is the funnel through which pass all the sea routes from the east to Europe via the Suez Canal. The Gulf of Aden constantly narrows to the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, constituting the lower entrance to the Red Sea. Aden is a fueling station for both naval and merchant ships and is, therefore, of vital strategic importance. Further off the Gulf of Aden, in the north and east, is the Arabian Sea. In its northern reaches, the Arabian Sea juts toward the Persian Gulf. The Gulf of Oman connects the Arabian Sea with the Persian Gulf. Opposite the eastern coast of the Indian subcontinent lies the triangle-shaped Bay of Bengal. Thus on different sides, the Indian Ocean washes the coasts of East Africa, Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula.

Geographically and also geopolitically, the Indian Ocean countries may be divided into littoral countries, the shores of which are washed by the waters of the ocean; the hinterland countries, the maritime trade of which passes through the littoral countries; and the user countries, which though located outside the Indian Ocean region make use of the ocean for maritime trade. There are according to these definitions some 37 littoral countries and 16 hinterland countries.⁶

The geographical location of the Indian Ocean, the important sea routes which traverse it, and the wealth of natural resources of the countries on the shores of the ocean are the main factors of its strategic importance. There is in the Indian Ocean a network of essential trading routes which connect, by way of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the countries of the Far East and Australia with the Middle East, and by way of the Suez Canal, the Far East and Australia with Europe and America. Besides, the countries on its shores possess a wealth of natural resources such as wool, jute, tea, rubber, tin, copper, gold, diamonds, uranium, magnesium, chromium, and antimony, in addition to oil which is today one of the most important resources.⁷ The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean was revealed during the 1973-74 oil crisis when it was demonstrated how vital the oil supplies from the Indian Ocean region were for the industrial world and how vulnerable to oil deprivation the West was. In view of this, it is not surprising that this ocean is the scene of big power rivalry. Moreover, with the Indian perception of her role and strategy in the Indian Ocean, the smaller states of the region, especially Pakistan, feel all the more threatened.

Purpose

The purpose of this paper therefore will be to analyze India's perceptions of her role and strategy in the Indian Ocean and the consequent Indian threat to the regional states in general and Pakistan in particular, with a view to suggesting possible security policy options for Pakistan to counter the Indian threat.

ENDNOTES

1. Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Conflict and Cooperation in Indian Ocean, The Australian National University, 1980, p. 1.

2. National Defense College (Pakistan), Strategic Studies Vol. IV, 1981, p. 30.
3. V. K. Bhasin, Superpower Rivalry in Indian Ocean, S. Chand and Company, New Delhi, 1978, p. 9.
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CHAPTER II

IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION

GENERAL

With the background knowledge of the previous chapter, a brief overview of the importance of the Indian Ocean as a whole has been included as a prelude to this chapter. It will help to understand the pattern of conflict and cooperation in the right perspective.

The Indian Ocean is rich in resources which are not, however, evenly distributed. Oil and gas are the foremost in terms of quantity and importance. Oil is mostly concentrated in its northwestern shores. Almost 90 percent of Japan's requirements and 60 percent of West European requirements have typically been met from this region. Trade routes of the Indian Ocean are the lifelines for the West and Japan. Similarly, the Soviet Union depends on these sea routes to link up its Pacific provinces with the rest of the USSR. Soviet trade with the countries of the region is also on the increase, which is clearly visible through intensive Soviet merchant traffic in the area. The Indian Ocean is also centrally located to serve as the main commercial trade route of the world.

CHOKE POINTS¹

o Strait of Hormuz. With the abundant oil traffic in the Gulf, this bottleneck has become the center of gravity for the industrialized nations of the world. Barely 20 miles across, it is arguably the most important outlet of all the world's seaways. Closing this point over an extended period would spell disaster for the economies of the West and Japan.

o Strait of Malacca. This serves as a conduit for commercial and military traffic in and out of the Indian Ocean. It is the second most vital strait for Japan after Hormuz and is equally important to the United States and USSR for their trade and military movement.

o Cape of Good Hope. This is an important observation post for monitoring tanker traffic destined for the West which cannot pass through the Suez Canal. Air and naval assets based here could seriously impede the traffic in the event of war.

o Horn of Africa. It dominates the Red Sea approaches to the Mediterranean. Any power having control over it is potentially in a position to divert the sea traffic via the Cape of Good Hope with its obvious implications.

o Sunda Gap. This is an important doorway to the Indian Ocean from the Far East. This is a possible alternative to Malacca and the Soviets are actively studying its hydrography.

SIGNIFICANT LITTORAL STATES

The Red Sea Region

This comprises Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia on the African side and Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic), and South Yemen (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) on the Asian side. The region's importance lies in its location as the main trade route which connects the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean. Involvement of the superpowers in this region has affected the foreign policy orientations of

the regional countries and has had an impact on the following local and regional conflicts:

- o Arab-Israel;
- o Somalia-Ethiopia;
- o Liberation struggle for Eritrea; and
- o North Yemen-South Yemen.

By far the most dangerous regional conflict is the Arab-Israel conflict.

Apart from its other well known ramifications, another Arab-Israeli clash is likely to result in a blockade of Bab el Mandeb Strait or another shut-down of the Suez Canal with disruption to major shipping routes. Another war between Ethiopia and Somalia could seriously affect the stability of the area. The situation in southern Arabia is far from stable because of the nature of both North and South Yemeni regimes and their indecisiveness over whether to fight or unite! Finally, the long and bitter struggle in Eritrea will take a toll in human suffering and tempt outsiders to intervene as long as it continues.

The Persian Gulf Region

This region includes Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman. The oil has made this area vital to the world at large and presents a peculiar scene of conflicts and cooperation, of radicalism and fundamentalism, and of superpower intrigue. Its only link with the high seas is through the strategic Strait of Hormuz squeezed between the Iranian shore and Omani tip of the Musandam Peninsula. The proven crude oil reserves of Gulf oil fields total over 350 billion barrels (over half the world's total), and additional reserves are constantly being discovered.

Their experience during the Iran-Iraq War and threats to the Strait of Hormuz have prompted the Gulf states into collective consideration of their security measures. The Gulf states have also shown concern about falling oil

revenues. Almost entirely dependent on oil revenues, the Gulf states would not be able to withstand a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

The South Asian Region

The region includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. India may be described as the dominant major power, Pakistan as a significant and reasonably cohesive middle power. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal are weak and small powers, and Bhutan is a mini-state. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka account for nearly two-thirds of the total population of all Indian Ocean countries.² Despite its large reservoir of manpower, the region is regarded as one of the poorest areas in the world.

India and Pakistan will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. Nepal continues to remain a buffer state, however, due to recent trade and economic sanctions imposed by India, it is liable to tilt towards China. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh support a long-standing initiative to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In fact, it was Sri Lanka's proposal at the Cairo Nonaligned Summit in 1964 and at the 26th Session of the General Assembly. Until today there has been no change in Sri Lanka's policy.

The Indian Ocean Islands

Amongst the many islands of the Indian Ocean, some form part of the mainland countries, e.g., the Andamans (India), Socotra (South Yemen); some constitute independent island states, e.g., Mauritius, Reunion, Comoros, Seychelles, and Maldives. Because of the strategic location of most of the islands spread over the Indian Ocean, they provide bases for the potential domination of various parts of the ocean. Masirah, belonging to Oman, can serve as an excellent staging area for the West as and when there is trouble around the Persian Gulf. Socotra commands the entrance to the Red Sea.

Madagascar, Reunion, and Mauritius are ideally located to influence the sea lanes rounding off the African coast. The importance of Diego Garcia for the U.S. cannot be overemphasized, located as it is in the center of the Indian Ocean. The Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal provide India an opportunity to exert its influence in the region. In case of any future conflict in the Indian Ocean, these various islands are liable to play an important role toward the final outcome.

EXTERNAL POWERS' INTEREST

United States

Eurasia has been the central priority for both the United States and USSR. The struggle for Eurasia is waged on three strategic fronts: the Far Western, the Far Eastern, and the South Western.³ The United States' interests in the Indian Ocean have come into sharp focus since the Arab-Israel War of 1973 and the subsequent oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Since then, Washington has negotiated the right of access from Berbera and Mombasa in East Africa to Oman in the Gulf. Besides Diego Garcia, the United States also has facilities and/or prepositioned equipment in Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Australia. The Carter Doctrine, issued on 23 January 1980, and the subsequent establishment of the RDJTF and USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) are indicative of the firm U.S. resolve to pursue the following interests:

- o Ensure uninterrupted access by Western nations and Japan to adequate oil supplies from the Gulf;
- o Keep the strategic lines of communication through the Indian Ocean open;
- o Resist and check the Russian influence in the region;

- o Promote political stability in the area;
- o And support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Soviet Union

Immediately after the British announcement of withdrawal, Soviet ships started showing their presence in the Indian Ocean. Two factors have contributed to the gradual spread of Soviet influence in the region. The first is the removal of the colonialist defense system in 1971 from the Gulf, and the second is the decaying of the regional pact arrangements. Moscow has developed the necessary infrastructure through a chain of supply points, deep sea moorings, and fleet anchorages in the northwest part of the Indian Ocean, around the Horn of Africa, and around the western and eastern coastlines of Africa. She has strengthened her position by concluding several long-term treaties of friendship and cooperation between 1971 and 1980 with Third World countries. Some of these treaties are with Indian Ocean littoral or hinterland states, i.e., Egypt (renounced later), India, Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen (PDRY). The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where Soviet influence is supreme, has become a major base since the abandonment of Somalian Berbera by the USSR. Soviet presence on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula makes the USSR the nearest great power to the Persian Gulf. Coupled with Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and a long border with Iran, the base at Aden makes the USSR a very strong contender for a sphere of influence in the region. All its efforts are directed toward satisfying certain interests:

- o Countering or denying U.S. strategic submarine deployment;
- o Maintaining communications links between European and East Asian Russia;

- o Increasing its capability to control the strategic sea lines of communication; and
- o . . . easing its influence in the region.

The People's Republic of China

China has made no secret of her apprehensions about the Soviet and prospective Japanese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Accordingly, she has embarked upon her naval expansion program and has made successful strides in building warships of a class larger than destroyers.⁴ She has acquired the capability of building nuclear submarines also. Based on numbers, the Chinese Navy occupies third place in the world.⁵ China has shown a willingness to enlarge the area of her influence in the Indian Ocean. She has developed close relations with Tanzania and can rely on naval facilities in Zanzibar. She is also showing increasing interest in South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa. China for the time being supports the presence of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean. In any case she has not as yet acquired the naval strength to challenge superpower naval strength in the region. However it is only a matter of time before China begins to look for port facilities, if not naval bases, so that her naval forces stationed in the South China Sea can operate in the Indian Ocean more frequently to support the PRC's power status appropriately.

Australia

Among the Indian Ocean littoral states Australia is the biggest in terms of territory, and roughly one-third of her coastline is on the Indian Ocean. Since the early 1970s Australia has been trying to improve her relations with Indian Ocean littoral states. She supports the American presence in the Indian Ocean. She has a formal alliance with the United States and has not

only allowed the Americans to build the North West Cape Communications Station, but has also offered to the U.S. Navy base facilities at Cockburn Sound.⁶ Canberra is currently following a contradictory policy by supporting the Americans over Diego Garcia and at the same time accepting the Zone of Peace concept. In the future, Australia is likely to continue to depend upon American support for her security, while at the same time increasing her participation in the affairs of the Indian Ocean region. She has a fair-sized naval force, but it is not strong enough to contest the primacy of India's, nor has Australia demonstrated any willingness to do so.

Japan

Presently Japan does not have the military capability to protect her imports through the Indian Ocean. She relies for the protection of her trade on the USA and other Western powers. Japan's relations with South Africa are also becoming significant. Japan is South Africa's third biggest export market, and South Africa is the fourth largest importer of Japanese goods. In response to the Soviet naval build up, Japan is being encouraged by Washington to step up its defense spending and to patrol sealanes up to 1,000 miles off its coastline. So far Japan has shown reluctance to step up her defense capability. However, the use of her Maritime Self-Defense Force to protect her vital ocean interests is a very distinct possibility. This could lead to an urge for an Indian Ocean presence.⁷

Great Britain

The British withdrawal from east of Suez was clearly the result of economic pressure rather than political. The U.K. still has considerable investment in and trade links with the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

Her interests can be seen largely as coinciding with the United States' interests, consequently London relies heavily on Washington for this purpose.⁸

France

French policymakers perhaps exhibit the most cogent policy in the Indian Ocean and consequently remain quite active in the region. France maintains the largest naval presence after that of U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. Reunion, near Mauritius, and the island of Mayotte (Mahore) in the Comoros are administratively parts of France and she continues to station army and air force in Djibouti.⁹

SIGNIFICANT REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Zone of Peace Proposal

The proposal to declare the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was initiated by Sri Lanka and ever since the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations General Assembly have adopted supportive resolutions based on the reports of ad hoc committees. The basic elements of the Zone of Peace proposal are:

- o Elimination of superpower presence and rivalry from the region;
- o Halting further escalation and expansion of superpower military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean;
- o Dismantling and elimination of naval bases and other military installations of the big powers in the region; and
- o Removal of nuclear weapons from the Indian Ocean.

In 1980 a United Nations General Assembly resolution called for a conference on the Zone of Peace proposal during 1981 at Colombo which the Western powers have so far been able to block despite subsequent resolutions

adopted by the Assembly. The United States and her allies have strong reservations on this concept. Washington has opposed the convening of the conference in view of its assessment that the security environment in the region has been adversely affected by the Soviet military presence in the littoral states.

Pakistan had supported the convening of the conference as per the Non-Aligned Movement declaration at Havana in 1979. However Pakistan had insisted that improvement of the political and security climate in the region was dependent on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which was essential to ensure success of the conference. Pakistan also has serious differences with India on issues of substance. India emphasizes strict adherence to the 1971 declaration which focuses on the elimination of big power presence from the area, which Pakistan considers detrimental to her interest. According to Pakistan the Zone of Peace must cover the areas of littoral and hinterland states besides the Indian Ocean itself. The concept in its present form, if implemented, will have the following adverse repercussions for Pakistan:

- o Soviet interests will continue to be served through treaties of friendship with littoral states, especially India.
- o The exclusion of big powers from the Indian Ocean would make India the preponderant naval power in the region.

Pakistan's efforts so far have been to broaden the scope of this Zone of Peace concept in the following manner:

- o by making this concept applicable to the territories of littoral as well as hinterland states;

- o by emphasizing the need to evolve steps against introduction or development of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean region or on the territories of the littoral states; and
- o by devising ways and means to establish a military balance between littoral and hinterland states.

There is at present little possibility of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace materializing in the foreseeable future. Its strategic importance to the superpowers is such that they are unlikely to agree to withdraw from the area. The Western countries, led by the USA, have taken a stand that in view of the present security and political climate in the region, the appropriate conditions do not exist for holding the conference. Pakistan's own security concerns regarding the uncertain situation in Afghanistan and India's apparent hegemonic designs compel her to support the Western position.

The Moslem Ummah

The Moslem population of the Indian Ocean littoral states accounts for nearly 500 million people and is a powerful group in the world forum. The Gulf Moslem countries have become rich in a short period. After the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, which ended cheap petroleum, the Arabs emerged as one of the world's most powerful monetary powers. However, both politically and economically the Moslem Ummah as a whole is unstable and, despite affluence, generally underdeveloped. Military coups, revolutions, and political upheavals are common. Some Moslem states are pro-West; some are pro-Soviet. Some are nonaligned, and most of them are caught up in the crossfire of the big power rivalry.

Moslem unity, which is supposed to be a dominant characteristic, seems to be more illusion than reality. The Moslem Ummah was never united for any

length of time or on any singular issue, not even at the time of the Arab-Israeli conflict which is a sensitive and emotional issue for the Moslems. Ethnic and regional factors exert a decisive influence despite religious affinity. The conflicts between Iran-Iraq, Malaysia-Indonesia, and Pakistan-Afghanistan confirm this view. The Ummah is divided into Arabs and non-Arabs and Shias and Sunnis. There is a conflict of views between Islamic fundamentalism and secular modernism. Therefore the Islamic bloc, despite its grouping into the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), is not likely to play a role for the collective good of the Ummah in the foreseeable future. With this perspective in view, Pakistan has had to devise her strategy in the region without expecting tangible support from the Moslem countries of the region.

Some of the more affluent Moslem littoral countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE could certainly afford sizeable naval forces, but, due to limitations of comparatively small populations, find it difficult to attract and train the requisite manpower. It is unlikely that they will be able to assemble more than a token force until the turn of the century. Iraq, in the meantime, is a possible contender for assuming the role of "policeman" of the Gulf. Pre-revolution Iran had acquired adequate potency to have a say in the maritime affairs of the region, but, with the turn of events, it has ceased to be a force of any major consequence, at least for the near future.

GEOSTRATEGIC FACTORS

As a result of big power rivalry the complex regional geopolitics of the Indian Ocean have become more complex. Despite their independence, those countries which were under colonial rule for a long time have not yet become politically or economically stable. Caught in the crossfire of big power rivalry, the littoral states are faced with the problems of establishing their

national identity, achieving rapid economic growth, attaining political stability, and safeguarding their hard-earned freedom. In addition, divisive forces springing from religious diversity, traditional antagonisms, and clashes of regional and national interest make these tasks even more difficult.

The Western powers have high stakes in the region, but their strategies and policies have failed to bring about stability in the area. The littoral countries are suspicious of them because, despite their claim to be democracies, they remain identified with colonialism and imperialism. The USSR, at the moment, seems to enjoy a comparative advantage in the region following her withdrawal from Afghanistan. China in the long run is more likely to influence the littoral and hinterland states.

It is obvious that in this influence-trading exercise, the perception is that the gain of one superpower can only be at the expense of the other. Soviets have to allocate appropriate naval forces to search for United States submarines in their peacetime stations so that their deployment might be swiftly neutralized in case of a conflict. So the Soviet naval forces which in the old contest were a simple show of force have become a strategic necessity. Similarly, the United States and her allies have to ensure their access to Gulf oil, and a permanent Soviet presence makes it a dire necessity for the Western bloc to maintain their Indian Ocean forces to deter possible Russian interference in the oil flow.

Despite the fact that Russian forces are out of Afghanistan, Moscow can influence littoral states militarily much sooner than USCENTCOM forces which are liable to be too late to do much on land. Consequently the United States is continuously making efforts to find bases and preposition its strategic stores in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and within the Persian Gulf itself to

be able to slow a Soviet onslaught until total available U.S. assets can materialize.

The Gulf region appears to be one of the more probable flash points for further confrontation of any kind between the two superpowers. It is obvious that, despite regional opposition, political and strategic competition between the superpowers remains intense. Neither side seems willing to concede any quarter by default and, despite ongoing events in the Soviet Union, the future likely will continue to see each side attempting to improve their respective positions.

The big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean has positive as well as negative effects on the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. The positive gain is that external powers act as a balancing factor in the region. No power of the region in their presence can become too strong or influential.

The concept of a Zone of Peace entails elimination of big power military and naval presence from the Indian Ocean region. If strictly implemented, it would be more suited to Indian interests as that would make India the dominant naval power in the region to the detriment of Pakistan and other countries.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER III
INDIA'S OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

GENERAL

Even before her independence, India's leaders and national strategists advocated a long-term policy of establishment of Indian supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has expanded phenomenally since independence, from a modest fleet of a few sloops and frigates, to the "blue water" navy of today. Curiously, it has grown at a much faster rate in quality and size during recent years, despite a radical change in India's favor in the geostrategic environment since the dismemberment of Pakistan in . Paradoxically, this enormous expansion of the Indian Navy, which is already the fifth largest in the world and the largest in the region, is predicated, according to Indian spokesmen, on the rationale of defensive security doctrine, but there is neither a significant external naval threat to the Indian coasts, nor is there any navy in the region which can effectively contest Indian claims to her territorial waters or to her Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

On the other hand, there are clear indications from the force levels, expansion programs, and from the statements of Indian political/military leaders and defense experts, of an offensive maritime security doctrine for the Indian Navy, with regional and global aims, which creates a rationale for a large and modern blue water navy. The aim, ostensibly, is to dominate the Indian Ocean by inhibiting the superpowers, so as to exercise hegemony over the Indian Ocean littoral, from Australia to South Africa, in peace and war, and to exploit their economic resources. Such a politico-military aim is a matter of great concern not only to the smaller states of the Indian Ocean

region, but also to the world powers having vital political, economic, and strategic interests in the region. The Indian aims and objectives seem to threaten not only the security of these states but also, eventually, the world order by creating regional imbalances and destabilization of the smaller and all the societies of the region.

INDIA'S AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

In order to understand India's aims and objectives, it would be worthwhile to have a look at the main points of the famous Indira Doctrine. These are:¹

- o India would not accept any external intervention in the South Asia region with anti-India implications.
- o Any South Asian state requiring external assistance must first seek assistance from India.
- o India would not tolerate any regional country calling for external assistance with anti-India bias.
- o India's exclusion from regional assistance requested by any South Asian country would be regarded as an anti-Indian move of the government concerned.

With the continuing Nehru dynasty until quite recently, and even after that, India is strictly following the above mentioned doctrine. There is little doubt that India's aim is to establish dominance over smaller and militarily weak regional countries and exert influence on the policies of the littoral states. India's clashes with Bangladesh on the question of river waters and immigration, with Nepal on the question of pursuing independent policy and immigration procedures, with Bhutan on the degree of freedom from India's control, with Sri Lanka over the issue of Tamils and the freedom of Sri Lanka to decide its own affairs, with the Maldives regarding intervention,

and with Pakistan over the refusal to solve the Kashmir problem since 1948 and over the recent Indian ingress into the Siachin glacier area across the line of control together constitute evidence confirming Indian hegemonic designs.² As part of the naval expansion and modernization, one aspect which stands out is India's gradual improvement in amphibious capabilities. (See Annex A, page 44.) The possession of ships and craft which facilitate landing operations gives a certain dimension to a country's sea power status. With this capability in view, Indian objectives in the Indian Ocean can be identified as follows:

- o To maintain and project her status as a regional maritime power through encouraging departure of the superpowers from the region.
- o To develop an effective naval capability in order to assert positive control over her areas of interest in the Indian Ocean.
- o To enhance her political and economic interests in the region through military coercion.
- o To subdue Pakistan through her political and military influence.

RELATIONS WITH SUPERPOWERS AND PAKISTAN

United States

o Washington's decision to upgrade the facilities at Diego Garcia has added a new dimension to Indo-American relations. India's position in this regard was stated by her former President, V. V. Giri, in an address to a joint session of the two houses of the Indian Parliament on 1 February 1974.

He said:

Along with the other countries of the region we have always urged that the Indian Ocean should be a Zone of Peace and should be free from military bases of big powers. . . . It is, therefore, a matter of great concern and disappointment to us that the United Kingdom and the United States of America have entered into an agreement

for the establishment of a military base in the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.³

o In 1971 when India supported the separatist rebels in East Pakistan and the resulting creation of Bangladesh, the United States showed its concern over this development by sending a naval task force into the region led by the nuclear carrier, USS Enterprise. Indian strategic analysts took serious note of this U.S. attempt to place pressure on India. The incident showed that India could not achieve independence in the prosecution of its foreign and security policies so long as a superpower could threaten India from the sea.⁴ Welcoming the arrival of India's first nuclear submarine in February 1988, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was willing to make oblique reference to the reasons for acquisition of the submarine, and these comments could be interpreted as a reference to the United States:

The strategies of outside powers in our region have forced upon us expenditure on building military strength which we would much rather have deployed for the removal of poverty and promotion of development. . . . If we are to keep the destiny of India in our hands, we must have full control of the waters around us.⁵

o The other major aspect of Indo-American relations is the question of U.S. milita to Pakistan. India thinks that the arms supply to Pakistan will cau on in the Subcontinent. However there is a dichotomy in her thinking as far as Soviet massive military aid to India is concerned. The late Mrs. Gandhi in a speech in Ottawa on 19 June 1973, alluding to the United States, denounced the arming of India's neighbors by big powers and expressed apprehension that this would encourage militaristic elements in those countries who had little use for democratic and peaceful solutions.⁶

o Due to obvious reasons the United States cannot ignore India. In spite of divergence in their national interests and strategies, especially in the

Indian Ocean, the two countries have maintained cordial relations. The United States has also agreed to transfer super computer technology and some jet engines to India.

Soviet Union

o The Soviet Union is the main ally of India. Their Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation of 9 August 1971 remains the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. It was this treaty which enabled India to dismember the eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971. Article 9 of the Treaty implies that in the event either of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the contracting parties will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries. Apart from such guarantees the USSR is also shouldering the major burden of supporting India's economic and military development program.⁷

o In the context of the Indian Ocean, India refuses to recognize or criticize the Soviet presence in the region because Indo-Soviet interests in the region have generally coincided in the past. India continues to lean on the Soviet Union and favor it, even when the Soviets were in occupation of Afghanistan. Although the Indian government had not condoned the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, it had not categorically condemned it either.

China

The border dispute between India and China remains unresolved. The Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's sore relations with Pakistan are some of the other reasons for the tense relations between the two countries. Although lately the relations between these two countries have improved, mainly because the

Soviets made a move to improve their relations with China, deep down there are signs of tension and distrust. In 1984 the Indians moved into the Siachin glacier area which is across the Line of Control into Pakistan's territory, and since then have refused to withdraw their troops, arguing that they are protecting Indian territory. It is through this area of Kashmir that China and Pakistan are linked by the mighty Karakorum Highway. The glacier move was perhaps the start of a flanking movement aimed at eventually cutting this link between Pakistan and her principal strategic ally.⁷ Apparently, the Indian government relies on her friendship with the Soviets to keep the Chinese in check.

Pakistan

India never really reconciled with the creation of Pakistan as an independent state. Historically speaking, three issues, namely Pakistan's stand on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, its acquisition of American arms, and its unwillingness to acknowledge in explicit or tacit terms India's claim to regional predominance, have been seen by India as major obstacles to normal relations with Pakistan. In consequence, the Pakistan-India relationship has been characterized by the tension that exists between two opposing concepts--sovereign equality and hegemony. Under the so-called Indira Doctrine, India apparently considers it her right to interfere in the internal affairs of the other South Asian countries as has been seen in East Pakistan in 1971 and in Sri Lanka and the Maldives more recently. In 1984 Indian troops moved into the Siachin glacier area across the Line of Control in Pakistani-held Kashmir and since then have refused to vacate the area. There have been times when both sides did try to reduce the tension. The Simla Agreement of 1972 was a treaty of peace signed by the two after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

However, the following factors have contributed directly to the present state of tension and acrimonious relations:

- o Internal strife in India, especially in the state of Punjab. India has been blaming Pakistan for helping the Sikh movement in the area.
- o Lack of a sound political system in Pakistan.
- o The continued American military assistance to Pakistan, which is the only source which can enable it to attain a viable defensive capability.
- o The alleged stepping up of Pakistani nuclear capability. In this regard the Pakistani proposal of making South Asia a nuclear weapons free area has not been accepted by India.
- o Inherent distrust between the governments and the peoples of the two countries. India's refusal to solve the long outstanding Kashmir issue is the main reason for this distrust.

INDIAN MARITIME INTERESTS

Describing Indian ambitions to dominate the entire Indian Ocean, Allain Lamballes writes:

Without abandoning its global ambitions, India is trying to exert its supremacy in South Asia. For her the Indian Ocean constitutes a privileged zone where she exercises an undisputed political influence, where she sells a part of her traditional goods and manufactures, and from where she gets the bulk of her needs of oil.⁸

In the not-too-distant future the Indian Ocean is likely to become an "Indian Lake." Consequently India is increasingly relying on maritime policies and naval strength to advance her economic, political, and military interests which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Economic Interests

In the economic field, two main interests are in sea resources and in shipping. These are elaborated as follows:

- o Development of offshore oil in the "Bombay High," and the further exploration for oil in the sea.
- o Overcoming the monopoly of the Western shipping cartels operating in the Indian Ocean by expanding her own merchant fleet.
- o The growing Indian interest in deep sea mining and exploration even beyond her EEZ limits. She is the first developing country to commence seabed mining.
- o More than 90 percent of her trade is dependent on this ocean. For secure shipping and sealanes she relies on a strong navy.

Politico-Military Interests

Commenting on conversations with a former Indian naval Chief of Staff, Walter K. Andersen in the December 1979 issue of Asian Survey repeats the view that

the long range objective of the Indian Naval program should be . . . a force equal in size and competence to the naval forces of any one of the superpowers now formally operating in the area.¹⁰

Admiral Chattergi, justifying the acquisition of a nuclear submarine force, states:

With sufficient strength of nuclear submarines, our Navy could easily be more powerful than the fleet that any of the superpowers would normally deploy in the Indian Ocean.¹¹

In the politico-military field, Indian interests are:

o To attain an appropriate naval capability to support India's big power image in the region. India has repeatedly acted to deter the smaller states in the region against radically falling out of line with Indian policies and interests.

o India wants to effectively control and administer the widely scattered islands in the Indian Ocean, which will not only serve as bases and survey ports but also show her presence in the region.

India, with its reach into the three most important waterways in the Indian Ocean, i.e., the Straits of Hormuz, Aden, and Malacca, is likely to attain a pivotal position in the region which cannot be ignored by any of the superpowers. The USSR has supported Indian naval development and initiatives in the area and, accordingly, is most likely to benefit. With a vigorous expansion program and by maintaining three naval commands, i.e., Western, Eastern, and Southern, India visualizes her role as the only maritime power amongst the littoral states capable of policing the Indian Ocean.

INDIAN NAVAL BUILD UP¹²

The Present Strength

The present strength of the Indian Navy is 149 ships of all types, including two aircraft carriers, 15 submarines (including 1 nuclear powered), and 132 other ships. This figure has doubled since 1970 and quintupled since 1947. (See Annex B, page 45.)

The Future Expansion Program

The Indian Navy has planned to enormously increase its strength from the present 149 ships to 299 of all types, including 3 aircraft carriers, 35 submarines (including 5 to 6 nuclear powered), and 261 other ships, by the

year 2000.¹³ This strength in itself will be more than that of all the navies of the region put together. Keeping the rate and trend of expansion in view, the Indian Navy can be expected to continue to expand even beyond 2000. There can be no other aim of this enormous expansion in size and quality than to match the superpower navies operating in the area and eventually to induce them to quit the Indian Ocean altogether, leaving it to India as the "Indian Lake," in line with the aspirations of Indian leaders and defense experts. The security concerns of the affected nations over such a development are not difficult to imagine.

INDIAN NAVAL CAPABILITIES--ANALYSIS

Being the strongest power in the western zone of the Indian Ocean with its enormous naval expansion program, and possessing the willingness to use this power, India has the potential of becoming a formidable sea power by the end of this decade.

India has consistently accused Pakistan of developing nuclear weapons and acquiring sophisticated weapons systems from the United States, thus upsetting the military balance in South Asia. Behind such rhetoric India legitimizes her own massive build up of naval forces and, furthermore, has succeeded in acquiring the best from both the superpowers.

The United States presence in the Indian Ocean is made up of detached elements of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. The Soviets draw their naval elements from the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. Neither of the superpowers can presently operate a self-contained Indian Ocean Fleet without seriously depleting its presence in other theaters. When and if the two superpowers create dedicated fleets for this area, the Indian Navy would constitute the deciding vote in determining the supremacy of one or the other power in the

Indian Ocean. So long as India maintains friendly ties with one of the superpowers, the other is not likely to run the risk of provoking India in regional conflicts. It is probable, therefore, that India would be allowed a fair degree of freedom of action in the Indian Ocean region as long as the interests of the two superpowers are not directly threatened.

In the South Asia context, the littoral states, except for Pakistan, have already accepted Indian hegemony. It is therefore predictable that India will try to intimidate Pakistan, politically as well as militarily, in order to impose its will. In this regard India is likely to do the following:

- o Attempt to deny Pakistan a physical presence in the area of her maritime interests including the EEZ.
- o Undertake increased naval presence missions, especially in the north Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, in order to project influence in support of foreign policy vis-a-vis Pakistan.
- o Impose, in the event of war, a naval blockade of Pakistan's only port of Karachi.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Gorbachev's new strategic thinking are likely to occasion a change in strategy (though not a change in heart) from a direct to an indirect strategy so as to continue to pursue Soviet policy goals in the region, particularly in the Indian Ocean littoral, through India. The Indian Navy, therefore, through closer cooperation, is likely to play a proxy role for the Soviets, in which further expansion is implied.

Nuclear powered submarines, TU-142 long-range reconnaissance planes (see Annex C, page 46), aircraft carriers, and air assault divisions are certainly not meant for war with Pakistan alone. The objectives extend far beyond that. An obvious one is influence over the Gulf, because India is not self-

sufficient in oil, and she may also wish to control Western access to oil in due course.

ENDNOTES

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6. Bhasin, p. 133.
7. Gregory Copley, "Pakistan on the Brink," Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 1989, p. 29.
8. Allain Lambales, "India and the Indian Ocean," Vikrant (New Delhi), June 1978, p. 22.
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CHAPTER IV

PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS AND SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMPULSIONS

Political

Ever since Pakistan gained its independence, it has had three major goals: to ensure its independence and security; to strengthen and develop its Islamic character and values; and to ensure its social and economic development. The search for political order was begun at the time of the birth of Pakistan but so far a viable political system has not been found. There has been experimentation with different systems within the Pakistani environment. Lately the governments have been trying to evolve a new political system with dual emphasis on Islamic and democratic principles. Until the new Islamic democratic system is put to a test and a reference to the people is made, the question of political legitimacy is likely to continue to haunt the government and political stability will remain a major issue. Consequently without a stable political order the security and economic aspects of the country will fall short of the desired level. The situation in Sind and Baluchistan is basically the result of an inadequate political order, which has been and will be exploited by the Indians and the Soviets, to suit their interests.

Geographical

o Pakistan is located in a strategic region as an important bridge between South Asia and the Middle East. It is placed among powerful neighbors, i.e., China, India, and, for all practical purposes, the Soviet Union. Its geographical proximity to the Strait of Hormuz makes it a strategic backyard of the Persian Gulf.¹ Also being sufficiently close to

the Gulf of Oman, Pakistan acquires a special monitoring capability vis-a-vis Persian Gulf mercantile traffic.

o Pakistan shares a common border with Iran, Afghanistan, China, India, and for all practical purposes with the Soviet Union. This makes Pakistan a unique focal point and its central location can be of immense value to the United States if it manages to obtain use of Pakistani soil for military bases.

o Pakistan's location is also in the path of the Soviet Union's historic southerly drive towards the Indian Ocean as was noted by many during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Russians have withdrawn from Afghanistan, but it is doubtful that they will abandon their long-term objective altogether. A southerly drive through Pakistan would have security implications for China. However, whether the Soviets drive towards the Indian Ocean through Pakistan or Iran, it stands to reason that both the superpowers could extract considerable military advantage from Pakistan's strategic geographical location.

o Pakistan's location is also not too far from the Red Sea. Due to its location Pakistan can dominate the crucial stretches and vital routes of the Arabian Sea, provided requisite measures of sea power and strategically conscious leadership are available. It not only can help its brotherly Moslem countries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in protecting common interests, but it can also make it possible for Pakistan to have a voice in international matters concerning the sea and its resources.

Psychosocial

As already discussed, India is in the process of building a power projection-oriented navy in the Indian Ocean region that is unlikely to come across any meaningful resistance from any of the regional maritime forces.

Pakistan came into being through a bitter and bloody struggle against Hindu domination in the subcontinent. It would be particularly humiliating for Pakistan to bow down to Indian or any of the superpowers' dictates. Acceptance of less than completely independent existence would tend to negate the very basis of Pakistan's creation. A satellite status therefore does not suit the psyche of the people of Pakistan. It is an important factor to consider to understand the future course of regional defiance by Pakistan.

Economic

Economically the Indian Ocean holds a vast potential of economic wealth for Pakistan. The total area of the continental shelf is 20,000 square miles and of the EEZ, 100,000 square miles. Pakistan has been making efforts in offshore oil exploration. About 92 percent of the country's export trade and 75 percent of its import trade are dependent on sea lines of communication.² Apart from oil, Pakistan's other major imports (including heavy machinery for industrialization, improvement of agriculture, and overall economic development) are from Japan and the Western world. Pakistan exports large quantities of its produce to various countries of the world and is thus heavily dependent on freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Malacca Straits for its economical well-being. It is therefore in the vital interest of Pakistan that it continues to enjoy freedom of navigation both during peace and war.

PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

General

Before analyzing Pakistan's policy options, it would be worthwhile to have a broad overview of Pakistan's present security environment. Superpower interests in the region and the Indian factor have already been covered,

therefore only the more pertinent additional factors having a direct bearing on Pakistan's security environment will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Situation in Afghanistan

Even after the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the situation inside that country has not changed much to reduce Pakistan's security concerns on its western border. Soviet massive support to the Kabul regime continues and is one reason for the ongoing war inside Afghanistan. Three million refugees still remain inside Pakistan, who, apart from being a security hazard, are a potential source of political, social, and economic pressures.

U.S. Strategy in the Region

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, the United States responded with a comprehensive system of military command for Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The purpose seems to be to protect U.S. interests in the region in the global context. The policy to some extent also provides a degree of assurance to the threatened states. However, in the regional context the policy does not ensure an appropriate military balance between various states of the region, particularly Pakistan and India. The present U.S. posture in the region may pose a caution for the Soviets, but the same may not be true for India, as far as her designs against Pakistan are concerned. War happened in 1971. It must never happen again; no one has a greater stake in remembering that than Pakistan.

Iran

The revolution and the Gulf War have adversely affected the traditional ties between Iran and Pakistan. Iran has also viewed Pakistan's close cooperation with the United States and Saudi Arabia with scepticism, but

Pakistan's strict neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War was beneficial for the long-term relationship between the two countries. Already favorable signs have started appearing which will have a positive impact on Pakistan's security.

China

Pakistan-China friendship has been persistent. The PRC's consistent political support has been of immense value to Pakistan. However China is preoccupied with her internal problems which will likely preclude her from playing an effective role in the region in the immediate future. It is unlikely, therefore, that in case of threat to Pakistan's security, China will be able to provide anything more than moral support.

India

Pakistan's refusal to accept India's hegemonic designs will continue to prolong the present state of friction in the subcontinent in particular and in the region in general. There is no likelihood of any major shift in the Indian strategic posture towards Pakistan in the foreseeable future.

Today Pakistan faces a security dilemma from more than one direction: externally, and a potential subversion threat internally. In the final analysis these security challenges will have to be faced by the Pakistani nation as a whole through appropriate preparations. There is little chance that Pakistan's regional security concerns will be totally congruent with the superpowers' global interests in the region; they have not been so in the past and are unlikely to be so in the future.

MARITIME INTERESTS

Pakistan's Maritime Objectives

- o To establish cordial relations with all littoral states of the Indian Ocean, with special emphasis on the Moslem countries.
- o To achieve a maximum degree of autonomy in seaborne commerce capacity.
- o To demarcate the EEZ with India, Iran, and Oman.
- o To develop naval power to ensure defense of territorial waters against seaward threats, to provide protection to sea lines of communication, and to police the EEZ.

Maritime Interests

- o Pakistan's survival depends upon well-protected, extensive maritime trade. Her lifelines are concentrated in the Western part of the Indian Ocean, and her freedom lies in the safety of sea lines of communication in the area.
- o To be able to face up to India's regional hegemony is the most important facet of Pakistan's maritime interest. It is therefore of utmost importance that Pakistan's maritime interests should be translated into appropriate and matching naval forces.
- o Lately the traditional division of the sea into territorial waters and the high sea has been replaced by functional divisions of territorial waters up to 12 miles, the contiguous zone of 24 miles, and the EEZ extending up to 200 miles. The EEZs of India and Pakistan overlap. India's refusal to agree on equitable distribution will cause a serious complication for Pakistan's maritime interests.
- o Pakistan's maritime interest is dependent upon cordial relations with the Gulf countries.

o An Indian Ocean Zone of Peace can only be meaningful for Pakistan in terms of maritime interests if the Indians commit to a nuclear weapons free zone and if the conventional force balance is maintained before withdrawal of extra-regional forces. In the absence of committed security assurances, India will not hesitate to advance its hegemony and try to deny Pakistan the use of its sea and its resources. Pakistan's maritime interest therefore lies in proportionate articulation of political, economic, and military policies to safeguard her maritime interests by plugging all security gaps against the seaward threat.

SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND ANALYSIS

Working out various security policy options/alternatives for Pakistan is a difficult strategic dilemma. In the prevailing geostrategic environment, and keeping in view the scope of this paper, the alternatives will have to be of a broad scope and nature. The availability and adoption of various alternatives are constrained due to the following factors:

- o Growing threat of a direct Indian aggression by vastly superior forces, an insecure and volatile situation along the western borders with Afghanistan, and an externally manipulated subversion threat within the country.
- o Commonality of interests, mutual coordination, and mutual commitments between India and the Soviet Union.
- o Unsatisfactory domestic circumstances within the country.
- o Lack of an appropriate and well-structured naval force to adequately safeguard the country's maritime interests.
- o The present state of relations and conflicting interests of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean in general and the Islamic Ummah in particular.

Keeping in view the above factors the possible policy alternatives for Pakistan are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Alternative 1 - Regression

- o Willingness to compromise with adversaries on their terms would not let Pakistan play its rightful role in the community of nations. It would imply acceptance of hegemonic designs of India and manipulation by the Soviets in order to suit their interests. However, such a policy option, if adopted, would deprive India or the USSR of a cause for provocation and aggression.
- o While analyzing this option, one is reminded of the purpose for which Pakistan was created with immense sacrifices offered by the Moslems of the subcontinent. It is only with a dignified and sovereign status that Pakistan can fulfil the ideological basis of its creation in accordance with the aspirations and will of its people.
- o In the prevailing environment, the regression policy alternative, if adopted, would lead Pakistan to a drastic curtailment of her liberty, ideological assertiveness, and the sovereign right to safeguard her independence. Pakistan would become just another Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Bhutan.

Alternative 2 - Reconciliation

- o Willingness to compromise, if not entirely give up, some of our vital and survival interests in order to avoid friction will almost certainly lead to a gradual hardening of position and attitude by our adversaries. In our past history of relations with India, this fact clearly stands out.
- o A deeper analysis of this option reveals that there really are no national interests which can be traded with India for the successful implementation of this option.

Alternative 3 - Deterrence

o This alternative would be based on Pakistan's ability to inflict such punishment on the potential aggressor as to make the aggression and its physical gain not worth the cost, thus deterring the aggressor from embarking upon any military adventure against Pakistan in the first place. However the adoption of this policy option will have to be supported and based upon the following prerequisites:

- oo Correct diplomatic alignment especially in the regional context.
- oo Adequate military capability.
- oo Internal political stability to support a solid social and economic base.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Having examined the present situation in the Indian Ocean region, and the dictates of converging and diverging interests of the regional and the extra regional powers, the policy alternatives for Pakistan accordingly have been analyzed. The Indian objective of establishing hegemony over the region, and superpower interests in the resources and deployment of their strategic forces in the region, stand out as the main aspects of this study vis-a-vis Pakistan's security policy options.

Notwithstanding adoption of the deterrence alternative, Pakistan must pursue a flexible and evenhanded foreign policy with the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and China, keeping relations well within the tolerance threshold of each power without excessive dependence. Pakistan must pursue its long-term aim for a practicable peace zone in the Indian Ocean and its littoral in South and Southwest Asia. Policy options must be kept open within the framework of nonalignment and the maintenance of neutrality in international and regional issues. Deterrence has to be backed up with self-reliance in security matters. American assistance and concern for our security has fluctuated in the past. Any marked improvement of Pakistan's relations with the Soviets and India do not appear to be possible in the near future without compromising its interests.

China in the near future will be busy setting its own house in order and pursuing its own interests in the region and protecting them. She is presently engaged in improving her relations with the United States, and to some extent with the Soviet Union and India and accordingly is likely to avoid any open confrontation with them. Therefore China will not be in a position

to fully support Pakistan in its struggle to safeguard its sovereign rights and security.

An important pillar of Pakistan's security is her strong relations with the Moslem world, especially with the Gulf states. Their moral, diplomatic, and financial support can be invaluable for Pakistan's future policy of self-reliance. Pakistan can derive innumerable advantages if she is in a position to influence the Moslem world. The future pattern of relations with Iran can play a significant role in this direction.

Pakistan must endeavor to achieve political stability through mature leadership and active participation by the masses. This is a must to enhance internal cohesion and a viable economic state to support its efforts to survive as an sovereign state.

ANNEX A

AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY--INDIAN NAVY

1. The Indian Navy is equipped with 18 amphibious ships. Details are as follows:

LSTs (Large)	1
LSTs (Medium)	8
LCUs	9
	--
Total:	18

2. Carrying capacity of amphibious ships:

a. LST(L) Magar Class

(1) 3,500 tons cargo, or 500 troops, or 15 tanks +8 armed vehicles, or 4 landing craft assault +2 motor boats +2 helos.

b. LST(M) Polnochiny Class

(1) 350 tons cargo, or 8 X T-54/T-55 tanks, or 8 X PT-75 tanks, or 8 X BMP - 1s, or 400 troops, or 3 X 105 mm guns with 3 towing vehicles.

c. LCUs

(1) 63 tons cargo, or 150 troops, or 1 X BMP-1 and 1 X 3-ton trucks, or 1 X PT-76 tanks and 3 tons cargo, or 2 X T-54/55 tanks.

3. The Indian Navy is capable of lifting and landing one brigade group, which is being further enhanced by acquiring more LSTs from Poland in addition to the indigenous construction of LSTs (Large) Magar Class and LCUs at GRSE Calcutta.

Source: Embassy of Pakistan, Washington.

ANNEX B

CHRONOLOGY OF EXPANSION--INDIAN NAVY

	<u>1947</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>2000 (projected)</u>
Aircraft Carriers	-	1	1	2	3
Surface Ships all types)	6(32)	35	75	132	261
Submarines	-	-	4	15	35
Total:	6(32)	36	80	149	299

CURRENT COMMANDWISE DEPLOYMENT--INDIAN NAVY, 1988

UNITS	<u>WNC(B)</u>	<u>ENC(V)</u>	<u>SNC(C)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Submarines	7	10	-	17
Aircraft Carriers	2	-	-	2
Missile Destroyers				
Frigates	11	11	3	25
Missile Boats/Corvettes	16	3	-	19
Seaward Defense Boats	-	11	-	11
Amphibious Ships	-	18	-	18
Minesweepers	8	6	6	20
Tankers/Tender Ships	3	1	-	4
Survey Ships/Craft	1	3	4	8
Auxiliaries	3	2	1	6
Total:	51	65	14	130
Misc				19
Grand Total:				149

Key:

WNC - Western Naval Command
 ENC - Eastern Naval Command
 SNC - Southern Naval Command
 (B) - Bombay
 (V) - Vishakhapatnam
 (C) - Cochin

Source: Embassy of Pakistan, Washington.

ANNEX C

CHARACTERISTICS--TU-142M AIRCRAFT

Role : Anti-submarine warfare and detection of surface ships

Range : 900 KM

Combat Radius : 7,200 KM

Maximum Speed : 900 Kmph

Height Ceiling : 60,000 ft

Pay Load : 188 tons

Engines : 4 Kunznetsov NK 12 MV turboprops engines--each with a max rating of 11,033 KW, with 14,795 ehp

Normal Fuel Capacity : 95,000 ltrs (25,100) gallons

Dimension : Wing Span - 167 ft 8 inches
Length - 162 ft 5 inches
Height - 39 ft 9 inches

Weight : 188,000 Kgs or 414,470 lbs

Tow Store Bays : Can carry sonobuoys, MAD, ESM, radar torpedoes and nuclear depth charges in its fuselage

Source: Embassy of Pakistan, Washington.

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